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Conceptual Foundations of the Balanced Scorecard 
Abstract 
David Norton and I introduced the Balanced Scorecard in a 1992 Harvard Business 
Review article (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). The article was based on a multi-company research 
project to study performance measurement in companies whose intangible assets played a central 
role in value creation (Nolan Norton Institute, 1991). Norton and I believed that if companies 
were to improve the management of their intangible assets, they had to integrate the measurement 
of intangible assets into their management systems. 
  After publication of the 1992 HBR article, several companies quickly adopted the 
Balanced Scorecard giving us deeper and broader insights into its power and potential. During the 
next 15 years, as it was adopted by thousands of private, public, and nonprofit enterprises around 
the world, we extended and broadened the concept into a management tool for describing, 
communicating and implementing strategy. This paper describes the roots and motivation for the 
original Balanced Scorecard article as well as the subsequent innovations that connected it to a 
larger management literature.  3 
 
“Conceptual Foundations of the Balanced Scorecard” 
Robert S. Kaplan 
 
  David Norton and I introduced the Balanced Scorecard in a 1992 Harvard 
Business Review article.
1 The article was based on a 1990 Nolan, Norton multi-company 
research project that studied performance measurement in companies whose intangible 
assets played a central role in value creation.
2 Our interest in measurement for driving 
performance improvements arose from a belief articulated more than a century earlier by 
a prominent British scientist, Lord Kelvin:
3 
I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express 
it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, 
when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and 
unsatisfactory kind.  
 
If you can not measure it, you can not improve it. 
 
Norton and I believed that measurement was as fundamental to managers as it was for 
scientists. If companies were to improve the management of their intangible assets, they 
had to integrate the measurement of intangible assets into their management systems. 
  After publication of the 1992 HBR article, several companies quickly adopted the 
Balanced Scorecard giving us deeper and broader insights into its power and potential. 
During the next 15 years, as it was adopted by thousands of private, public, and nonprofit 
enterprises around the world, we extended and broadened the concept into a management 
tool for describing, communicating and implementing strategy. In this paper, I describe 
the roots and motivation for the original Balanced Scorecard article as well as the 
subsequent innovations that connected it to a larger management literature. The paper 
uses the following structure for organizing the origin and subsequent development of the 
Balanced Scorecard: 
1.  Balanced Scorecard for Performance Measurement 
2.  Strategic Objectives and Strategy Maps  
3.  The Strategy Management System 
4.  Future Opportunities 4 
 
 
Balanced Scorecard for Performance Measurement 
Figure 1 shows the original structure for the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). The BSC retains 
financial metrics as the ultimate outcome measures for company success, but supplements these 
with metrics from three additional perspectives – customer, internal process, and learning and 
growth – that we proposed as the drivers for creating long-term shareholder value.  
 
Figure 1:  Translating Vision and Strategy:  Four Perspectives
Vision and
Strategy
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1.1. Historical Roots: 1950-1980 
The Balanced Scorecard, of course, was not original for advocating that nonfinancial 
measures be used to motivate, measure, and evaluate company performance. In the 1950s, a 
General Electric corporate staff group conducted a project to develop performance measures for 5 
 
GE’s decentralized business units (Lewis, 1955).
2 The project team recommended that divisional 
performance be measured by one financial and seven nonfinancial metrics. 
1.  Profitability (measured by residual income) 
2.  Market share 
3.  Productivity 
4.  Product leadership 
5.  Public responsibility (legal and ethical behavior, and responsibility to 
stakeholders including shareholders, vendors, dealers, distributors, and 
communities) 
6.  Personnel development 
7.  Employee attitudes 
8.  Balance between short-range and long-range objectives 
 
One can see the roots of the Balanced Scorecard in these eight objectives. The financial 
perspective is represented by the first GE metric, the customer perspective with the second, the 
process perspective with metrics 3 -5, and the learning and growth perspective with metrics 6 and 
7. The 8
th metric captures the essence of the Balance Scorecard, encouraging managers to achieve 
a proper balance between short and long-range objectives. Unfortunately, the noble goals of the 
1950s GE corporate project never got ingrained into the management system and incentive 
structure of GE’s line business units.  In fact, despite metrics 5 and 8 in the above list, several GE 
units were subsequently convicted of price-fixing schemes, with their managers claiming that 
corporate pressure for short-term profits led them to compromise long-term objectives and their 
public responsibilities. 
At about the same time as the GE project, Herb Simon and several colleagues at the 
newly-formed Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Institute of Technology 
(later Carnegie-Mellon University) identified several purposes for accounting information in 
organizations: 
Scorecard questions: “Am I doing well or badly?” 
Attention-directing questions: “What problems should I look into?” 
Problem-solving questions: “Of the several ways of doing the job, which is the    
 best? 
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Simon and his colleagues explored the role for financial and nonfinancial information to inform 
these three questions. This study was perhaps the first to introduce the term “scorecard” into the 
performance management discussion. 
  Peter Drucker introduced management by objectives in his classic 1954 book, The 
Practice of Management. Drucker argued that all employees should have personal performance 
objectives that aligned strongly to the company strategy: 
Each manager, from the “big boss” down to the production foreman or the chief 
clerk, needs clearly spelled-out objectives. These objectives should lay out what 
performance the man’s [sic] own managerial unit is supposed to produce. They 
should lay out what contribution he and his unit are expected to make to help 
other units obtain their objectives. […] These objectives should always derive 
from the goals of the business enterprise. […] [M]anagers must understand that 
business results depend on a balance of efforts and results in a number of areas. 
[…] Every manager should responsibly participate in the development of the 
objectives of the higher unit of which his is a part. […] He must know and 
understand the ultimate business goals, what is expected of him and why, what 
he will be measured against and how (Drucker 1954, pp. 126-9). 
 
Despite Drucker’s insights and urgings, however, management by objectives in the next half-
century mostly became a somewhat bureaucratic exercise, administered by the human resources 
department, based on local goal-setting that was operational and tactical, and rarely informed by 
business-level strategies and objectives. Companies at Drucker’s time and for many years 
thereafter lacked a clear way of describing and communicating top-level strategy in a way that 
middle managers and front-line employees could understand and internalize. 
In the mid-1960s, Robert Anthony, building upon the decade-earlier research by Simon et 
al, and on another article by Simon on programmed versus nonprogrammed decisions, proposed a 
comprehensive framework for planning and control systems. Anthony identified three different 
types of systems: strategic planning, management control, and operational control. Strategic 
planning was defined as:  
the process of deciding upon objectives, on changes in these objectives, on the 
resources used to attain these objectives, and on the policies that are to govern 
the acquisition, use, and disposition of these resources (Anthony 1965, p.16). 
 
Foreshadowing the subsequent development of strategy maps, Anthony claimed that strategic 
planning depends “on an estimate of a cause-and-effect relationship between a course of action 
and a desired outcome,” but concluded that, because of the difficulty of predicting such a 
relationship, “strategic planning is an art, not a science.” Further, Anthony noted that strategic 7 
 
planning is not accompanied by what we would today call strategic control, “Although strategic 
revision is important, top management spends relatively little time in this activity.” Anthony also 
believed that information for strategic planning usually had a financial emphasis.  
Anthony’s second category, management control, concerned “the process by which 
managers assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organization’s objectives” (Anthony 1965, p. 17). He observed that 
management control systems, with rare exceptions, have an underlying financial structure; that is, 
plans and results are expressed in monetary units … the only common denominator by means of 
which the heterogeneous elements of outputs and inputs can be combined and compared. He 
acknowledged, however,  
Although management control systems have financial underpinnings, it does not 
follow that money is the only basis of measurement, or even that it is the most 
important basis. Other quantitative measurements, such as […] market share, 
yields, productivity measures, tonnage of output, and so on, are useful. (Anthony 
1965, p. 42) 
 
Anthony described the third category, operational or task control, as “the process of 
assuring that specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently.” He stated that information 
for operational control was mostly nonmonetary, though some information could be denominated 
in monetary terms (presumably, frequent variance reports on labor, machine, and materials 
quantity and cost variances). 
  Thus the roots of management planning and control systems encompassing both financial 
and nonfinancial measurement can be seen in these early writings of Simon, Drucker, and 
Anthony. Despite the advocacy of these scholars, however, the primary management system for 
most companies, until the 1990s, used financial information almost exclusively and relied heavily 
on budgets to maintain focus on short-term performance. 
1.2. Japanese Management Movement: 1975-1990 
During the 1970s and 1980s, innovations in quality and just-in-time production by 
Japanese companies challenged the Western leadership in many important industries. Several 
authors argued that Western companies’ narrow focus on short-term financial performance 
contributed to their complacency and slow response to the Japanese threat.  Johnson and Kaplan 
(1987) reviewed the history of management accounting and concluded that US corporations had 
become obsessed with short-term financial measures and had failed to adapt their management 8 
 
accounting and control systems to the operational improvements from successful implementation 
of total quality and short-cycle-time management.   
A Harvard Business School project on Council on Competitiveness (Porter, 1992) echoed 
these critiques when it identified the following systematic differences between investments made 
by US corporations versus those made in Japan and Germany: 
The US system is less supportive of investment overall because of its sensitivity to 
current returns … combined with corporate goals that stress current stock price over 
long-term corporate value. 
 
The US system favors those forms of investment for which returns are most readily 
measurable. … This explains why the United States underinvests, on average, in 
intangible assets [N.B., product and process innovation, employee skills, customer 
satisfaction] where returns are more difficult to measure.  
 
The US system favors acquisitions, which involve assets that can be easily valued over 
internal development projects that are more difficult to value. (Porter, 1992, p. 72-73). 
 
Some accounting academics proposed methods by which a firm’s spending to create 
intangible assets could be capitalized and placed as assets on the corporate Balance Sheet. During 
the 1970s, there was a burst of interest in human resources accounting (Flamholtz, 1974; Caplan 
and Landekich, 1975; Grove et al, 1977). Subsequently, Baruch Lev and his doctoral students and 
colleagues proposed that financial reporting could be more relevant if companies capitalized their 
expenditures on intangible assets or found other methods by which these assets could be placed 
on corporate Balance Sheets. While such a treatment is consistent with Lord Kelvin’s (and our) 
advocacy of measurement to improve understanding and management, none of these approaches 
gained traction in actual companies. Several factors led to the lack of adoption of placing values 
for intangible assets on corporate Balance Sheets. 
First, the value from intangible assets is indirect. Assets such as knowledge and 
technology seldom have a direct impact on revenue and profit.
 Improvements in intangible assets 
affect financial outcomes through chains of cause-and-effect relationships involving two or three 
intermediate stages. For example, consider the linkages in the service management profit chain 
(Heskett et al, 1994; Heskett, Sasser and Schlesinger, 1997), a development done in parallel and 
consistent with our Balanced Scorecard approach: 
  investments in employee training lead to improvements in service quality 
  better service quality leads to higher customer satisfaction 
  higher customer satisfaction leads to increased customer loyalty 9 
 
  increased customer loyalty generates increased revenues and margins.  
 
Financial outcomes are separated causally and temporally from improving employees’ 
capabilities. The complex linkages make it difficult if not impossible to place a financial value on 
an asset such as workforce capabilities or employee morale, much less to measures changes from 
period to period in such a financial value. 
Second, the value from intangible assets depends on organizational context and strategy. 
This value cannot be separated from the organizational processes that transform intangibles into 
customer and financial outcomes. A corporate Balance Sheet is a linear, additive model. It 
records each class of asset separately and calculates the total by adding up each asset’s recorded 
value. The value created from investing in individual intangible assets, however, is neither linear 
nor additive. 
Senior investment bankers in a firm such as Goldman Sachs are immensely valuable 
because of their knowledge about complex financial products and their capabilities for managing 
relationships and developing trust with sophisticated customers. People with the same knowledge, 
experience, and capabilities, however, are nearly worthless to a financial services company such 
as etrade.com that emphasizes operational efficiency, low cost, and technology-based trading. 
The value of an intangible asset depends critically on the context – the organization, the strategy, 
and other complementary assets – in which the intangible asset is deployed.  
Also, intangible assets seldom have value by themselves.
3  Generally, they must be 
bundled with other intangible and tangible assets to create value. For example, a new growth-
oriented sales strategy could require new knowledge about customers, new training for sales 
employees, new databases, new information systems, a new organization structure, and a new 
incentive compensation program. Investing in just one of these capabilities, or in all of them but 
one, could cause the new sales strategy to fail. The value does not reside in any individual 
intangible asset. It arises from creating the entire set of assets along with a strategy that links 
them together. The value-creation process is multiplicative, not additive. 
Rather than attempt a solution to the measurement and management of intangible assets 
within the financial reporting framework, several articles and books in the 1980s recommended 
that companies integrate nonfinancial indicators of their operating performance into their 
management accounting and control systems, e.g. Howell et al. (1987), Berliner and Brimson 
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(1991), Kaplan (1990). Some authors went further when they urged that internal reporting of 
financial information to managers and employees, especially those tasked with improving 
operations by continuous improvement of quality, process yields, and process cycle times, be 
abolished. 
Managing with information from financial accounting systems impedes business 
performance today because traditional cost accounting data do not track sources 
of competitiveness and profitability in the global economy. Cost information, per 
se, does not track sources of competitive advantage such as quality, flexibility 
and dependability. […] Business needs information about activities, not 
accounting costs, to manage competitive operations and to identify profitable 
products (Johnson, 1980, 44-5). 
Essentially, these authors argued that companies should focus on improving quality, 
reducing cycle times, and improving companies’ responsiveness to customers’ demands. Doing 
these activities well, they believed, would lead naturally to improved financial performance.  
The US Government in 1987 introduced the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award 
to promote quality awareness, recognize quality achievements, and publicize successful quality 
strategies. The initial set of Baldrige criteria included financial metrics (profits per employee), 
customer-perceived quality metrics (market cycle time, late deliveries), internal process metrics 
(defects, total manufacturing time, order entry time, supplier defects) and employee metrics 
(training per employee, morale). But in the early 1990s, several studies revealed that even 
businesses that had received the Baldrige Award for quality excellence could encounter financial 
difficulties, suggesting that the link, assumed by the academic scholars quoted above, between 
continuous process improvement and financial success was far from automatic.  
During the late 1980’s, I wrote several case studies that described how some companies 
had integrated well financial information with nonfinancial information on process quality and 
cycle times for front-line employees. In an operating department of a large chemical company,
4 a 
chemical-engineer department manager had introduced a daily income statement for the operators 
in his department. Even though the employees already had access (every 2-4 hours) to thousands 
of observations about operating parameters, throughput, and quality, the new daily income 
statement proved a big hit, and helped the employees set production records for throughput and 
quality. The daily income statement helped employees quickly assess the consequences from off-
spec production or machine downtime, enabled them make trade-offs among conflicting demands 
on quality and throughput, and guided and justified their decisions about spending to improve 
quality and throughput. 
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  Another case described how a Big-3 automobile engine fabrication plant had made a deep 
commitment to total quality management principles. It provided decentralized work teams with 
continuous information about machine downtime and scrap to facilitate operational improvements 
at bottleneck machines and processes, and to eliminate the root causes of scrap and off-spec 
production. But in addition to the daily information on machine downtime, throughput and scrap 
(all nonfinancial measures), the work teams received a daily report on their spending on indirect 
materials, such as supplies, tools, scrap and maintenance materials, plus a weekly report on total 
overhead expenses charged to their departments, including telephone, utilities, indirect labor, and 
salaries of engineering and technical assistants. Plant management wanted the teams not only to 
improve quality and throughput but also to make decisions that could directly influence the costs 
being incurred in their departments.
5  These two cases revealed the power of complementing 
nonfinancial information with financial information, even for front-line production employees.  
  A third case, about a semiconductor company, Analog Devices, described how executives 
at the top of the organization benefited from seeing nonfinancial information. Analog Devices, 
like the chemicals plant and the Big-3 automobile engine plant, had introduced a highly 
successful quality management system, which included an innovative quality improvement 
metric.
6  In addition, Analog’s vice president of quality and improvement, an experienced 
Baldrige Award examiner, had translated the Baldrige criteria into an internal corporate scorecard 
for his executive team. The corporate scorecard included some high-level financial metrics that 
the executive team had been accustomed to managing, but also the Baldrige quality metrics 
organized by three other perspectives:  
  customer quality metrics, such as on-time delivery, lead time, and customer-
measured defects 
  manufacturing process metrics, such as yield, part-per-million defect rates, and 
cycle times 
  employee metrics, such as absenteeism and lateness.  
The Analog scorecard signaled that to make quality improvement a senior executive focus, the 
measurement system should be expanded beyond financial indicators to include an array of 
quality metrics relating to customers, manufacturing processes, and employees.  
  The three cases provided successful counter-examples to the various scholars and 
consultants who argued that front-line employees need see only nonfinancial indicators while 
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6   “Analog Devices: The Half-Life System,” HBS Case #9-190-061. 12 
 
senior management can and should focus only on financial ones. The cases showed how front-
line employees could benefit from seeing financial metrics, while senior executive teams 
benefited from supplementing their financial view of the world with metrics about customers, 
quality, and employees. Thus the stage was set for thinking about a general framework by which 
both senior-level executive teams and front-line production workers would receive financial and 
nonfinancial information. 
1.3. Shareholder Value and the Principal-Agent Framework 
  Not all academics, however, had been exposed to the recent advances in operations 
management. Many remained focused on economics and finance, especially the efficient markets 
theory from the 1960s and early 1970s (Fama, 1971). Economists also introduced principal-agent 
theory (Jensen-Meckling, 1976, Harris-Raviv, 1979; Holmström, 1979, Grossman-Hart, 1983) to 
formalize the inherent conflict of interests between hired executive teams and the companies’ 
dispersed shareholders (owners). The principal-agent adherents urged companies to provide more 
financial incentives to senior executive teams, especially incentives based on financial 
performance, the typical “outcome” measure assumed in principal-agent models. Efficient 
markets research; suggested that stock prices continually reflected all the relevant public 
information about companies’ performance, and that executives’ compensation could be better 
aligned with owners’ interests through expanded use of stock options and other equity rewards 
(Jensen-Meckling, 1976; Fama-Jensen, 1983). In a similar vein, some argued for aligning 
compensation to better accounting surrogates of stock market performance, especially residual 
income under its new name, economic value added (Stewart, 1991). 
The 1980s saw a huge increase in the linkage between executives’ pay and incentives to 
financial performance. For the financial economists at the vanguard of this movement, the idea of 
senior executives paying attention to nonfinancial performance metrics was close to blasphemous. 
As Michael Jensen (2001), a leading financial economics scholar, has stated: 
Balanced Scorecard theory is flawed because it presents managers with a 
scorecard which gives no score – that is no single-valued measure how they have 
performed.  Thus managers evaluated with such a system […] have no way to 
make principled or purposeful decisions.  
 
  I obviously agree with Jensen that managers cannot be paid by a set of unweighted 
performance metrics. Ultimately, if a company wants to set bonuses based on measured 
performance, it must reward based on a single measure (either a stock market or accounting-
based metric) or provide a weighting among the multiple measures a manager has been instructed 13 
 
to improve. But linking performance to pay is only one component of a comprehensive 
management system.  
  Consider an airplane where passengers contract with the pilot for a safe and on-time 
journey. One can imagine an airplane cockpit designed by a financial economist. It consists of a 
single instrument that displays the destination to be achieved and the desired time of arrival. Or, 
the pilot is given a more complex navigation instrument where the movement of the needle 
represented a weighted average of estimated time to arrival, fuel remaining, altitude, deviation 
from expected flight path, and proximity to other airplanes. Few of us would feel comfortable 
flying in a plane guided only by the single instrument even though the incentives of the pilot and 
the passengers for a safe, on-time arrival are perfectly aligned. Incentives are important, but so 
also are information, communication, and alignment. 
1.4. Uncertainty and Multi-Period Optimization 
  Many of the principal-agent models developed by economists and finance scholars are 
single-period in which the firm’s output gets revealed at the end of the period and no further 
managerial (agent) actions are required. In these cases, contracting on output, such as measured 
financial performance, can be optimal. Or, if financial performance, measured by end-of-period 
stock price or economic value added, is a complete and sufficient statistic for the value managers 
have created during the period, then incentive contracts based on stock prices or economic value 
added can also be optimal. But many of the actions that managers take during a period – such as 
upgrading the skills and motivation of employees, advancing products through the research and 
development pipeline, improving the quality of processes, and enhancing trusted relationships 
with customers and suppliers – are not revealed to public investors so that their implications for 
firm value cannot be incorporated into end-of-period stock prices. Also, while managers may 
know the amount they spent on enhancing their intangible assets, they may have little idea, in the 
short-run, about how much value they have created. And, for sure, such value increases (or 
decreases if the expenditures do not generate future value in excess of the amount spent) do not 
get incorporated into the end-of-period stock price or residual value (economic value added) 
metric. 
  Dynamic programming teaches us that the optimal actions in the first period of a multi-
period model are far from the optimal actions in the final period. Managers attempting to 
maximize total shareholder value over, say, a ten year period cannot accomplish this goal by 
optimizing reported financial performance or stock price, period-by-period. The Balanced 
Scorecard recognizes the limitation of managing to financial targets alone in short-time horizons 14 
 
when managers are following a long-term strategy of enhancing the capabilities of their customer 
and supplier relationships, operating and innovation processes, human resources, information 
resources, and organizational climate and culture. But because the links from process 
improvements and investments in intangible assets to customer and financial outcomes are 
uncertain (recall the financial problems of several of the early excellent-quality companies), the 
Balanced Scorecard includes the outcome metrics as well to signal when the long-term strategy 
appears to be delivering the expected and desired results. 
1.5. Stakeholder Theory 
  Stakeholder theory offers another multi-dimensional approach for enterprise performance 
measurement. Stakeholders are defined as the groups or individuals, inside or outside the 
enterprise, that have a stake or can influence the organization’s performance. The theory 
generally identifies five stakeholder groups for a company: three of them, shareholders, 
customers, and communities, define the external expectations of a company’s performance; the 
other two, suppliers and employees, participate with the company to plan, design, implement and 
deliver the company’s products and services to its customers (Atkinson et al., 1997, p. 27). 
Management control scholars who apply stakeholder theory to performance measurement, believe 
“performance measurement design starts with stakeholders” (Neely and Adams, 2002). The 
stakeholder approach to performance measurement starts by defining objectives for what each 
stakeholder group expects from the corporation and how each group contributes to the success of 
the corporation. Once stakeholder expectations or, even further, implicit and explicit contracts 
between the stakeholders and the corporation get defined, the corporation then defines a strategy 
to meet these expectations and fulfill the contracts. Thus, while the Balanced Scorecard approach 
starts with strategy and then identifies the inter-relationships and objectives for various 
stakeholders, the stakeholder approach starts with stakeholder objectives and, in a second step, 
defines a strategy to meet shareholder expectations.  
  Just as Chandler articulated that strategy precedes structure, I strongly believe that 
strategy also precedes stakeholders. The stakeholder movement likely developed to counter the 
narrow shareholder value maximization view articulated by Milton Friedman and, subsequently, 
financial economists, such as Jensen. In this spirit, I believe the stakeholder helped us appreciate 
the value from nurturing multiple relationships that drive long-term and sustainable value creation. 
But stakeholder theory confuses means and ends, and therefore ends up less powerful, less 
actionable, and, ultimately, less satisfying (at least to me) than the strategy map/Balanced 
Scorecard approach. We advocate selecting a strategy first, and only subsequently working out 15 
 
the relationship with stakeholders, as needed by the strategy. I will illustrate my point of view 
with two examples. 
  First, let’s take the example of Mobil’s US Marketing and Refining, a well-documented 
Balanced Scorecard implementation.
7   Mobil learned, through marketing research, that its 
customers were heterogeneous. Some valued low price only; for them Mobil should offer the 
cheapest prices, matching or beating the prices of discount stations and the other major gasoline 
companies. Other customers, however, were not so price sensitive and were willing to pay a price 
premium, say up to $0.10-0.12 per gallon, if they could have a superior buying experience (quick 
serve, pay by credit cards at the pump, clean rest rooms, friendly helpful employees, great 
convenience store, etc.). Stakeholder theory fails here. Which customers’ expectations should 
Mobil satisfy? It could not be the best for both customer groups. Having larger gasoline stations, 
with more pumps, equipped with self-pay mechanisms, better-paid and more trained and 
experienced employees, and a full service convenience store costs money, and these costs would 
need to be covered by higher prices, thereby disappointing the price-sensitive customers. If Mobil 
offered the lowest prices, it could not afford to invest in the employees, the convenience store, 
and the larger stations with more self-service and self-pay pumps, thereby disappointing the 
customers desiring a great buying experience. 
  Strategy is about choice. Companies cannot meet the expectations of all their possible 
customers. Wal-Mart meets the apparel needs of one market segment of customers (price-
sensitive), Nordstrom meets the needs of another segment (customer relationships and solutions), 
and Armani and Ferragamo meet the expectations of a third segment (product-leading fashion, 
fabric, and fit; price-insensitive). Similarly, customers of Southwest Airlines have different 
expectations of performance than the business and first class customers who fly British Airways. 
Strategy determines which customers the company has decided to serve and the value proposition 
that it will offer to win the loyalty of those customer segments. The determination of strategy 
must come before defining measures of customer satisfaction and loyalty. Otherwise, following 
the recommendations of the stakeholder theorists, the company would attempt to meet the 
expectations of all the existing and potential customers it could serve, getting stuck “in the 
middle,” as described by Michael Porter, with both a high cost and a non-differentiated approach, 
a recipe for strategy failure. 
  A similar situation occurs for employees. The Balanced Scorecard deliberately did not 
label its fourth perspective the “employees” or “people” perspective, choosing a more generic 
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name, “learning and growth,” to signal that we were not taking a pure stakeholder approach. 
Under the BSC approach, employee objectives always appear (in the learning and growth 
perspective) but they get there because they are necessary for the strategy, not because someone 
has labeled them as a “stakeholder.” Consider a pharmaceutical company in the early 1990s. One 
of its most important groups of employees (what we would subsequently call a strategic job 
family) is the chemists performing research to screen and identify new compounds to treat 
specific diseases. The stakeholder approach would interview these key employees to learn their 
career expectations and develop a strategy that would meet their expectations and strive to 
continually motivate and satisfy these employees.  
  During the 1990s, however, and continuing into this century, the key scientific discipline 
for new drug development shifted from chemistry to biology. The new key employees became 
molecular biologists and geneticists. Pharmaceutical companies shifted their strategies to adapt to 
the new technologies; the fate of their previous key stakeholder, Ph.D. chemists, became more 
tenuous, especially if they did not acquire dramatic new capabilities and competencies so that 
they could contribute to new drug development. Again, the stakeholder view would lock the 
company into maintaining relationships with its soon-to-be-obsolete employee group and not 
moving swiftly enough to reflect that it needed entirely new employees to help it implement the 
new strategy. 
  Stakeholder theorists also criticize the Balanced Scorecard for not having a separate 
perspective for suppliers, one of their five essential stakeholder groups. But as with employees, 
suppliers get on the scorecard (typically in the Process perspective) when they are essential to the 
strategy. So companies, such as Wal-Mart, Nike and Toyota, for whom suppliers provide a 
critical component in creating sustainable competitive advantage, would certainly feature supplier 
performance in their strategy maps. But, consider a company like Mobil US Marketing and 
Refining, whose main suppliers are petroleum exploration and production companies, providing a 
commodity, such as crude oil, and construction companies, who build refineries and pipelines. 
These suppliers provide essential products and services but don’t provide any differentiation or 
support of Mobil’s strategy. Similarly, a community bank following a customer intimacy strategy 
gets its raw material, money, from the US Federal Reserve system. Suppliers are not a critical 
component of its strategy. So Mobil USM&R and the community bank may not feature suppliers 
on their scorecards because they don’t contribute to the differentiation and sustainability of their 
strategies. Again, strategy precedes stakeholders and, in this case, may reveal that one of the 
stakeholder categories is not decisive for the strategy. 17 
 
  Finally, the Balanced Scorecard does include performance in communities as process 
perspective objectives when such performance does contribute to the differentiation in the 
strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 2003). This view matches that articulated by Michael Porter when 
he advocates that environmental and social performance be aligned to and support the company 
strategy (Porter and Kramer, 1999, 2006). Occasionally companies do not want shareholder value 
to be the unifying paradigm for its strategy. That’s ok; it’s their choice. They don’t have to 
abandon the Balanced Scorecard methodology and switch to the stakeholder view. They can use a 
strategy map and Balanced Scorecard to articulate their strategy that attempts to simultaneously 
create economic, environmental and social value, and to balance and manage the tensions among 
them. This is exactly the path taken by Amanco, a Latin American producer of water treatment 
solutions, whose founding shareholder believed deeply in triple-bottom line performance.
8 
  In summary, stakeholder theory was useful to articulate a broader company mission 
beyond a narrow, short-term shareholder value-maximizing model. It increased companies’ 
sensitivity about how failure to incorporate stakeholder preferences and expectations can 
undermine an excessive focus on short-term financial results. The Balanced Scorecard, however, 
incorporates stakeholder interests endogenously, within a coherent strategy and value-creation 
framework, when outstanding performance with those stakeholders is critical for the success of 
the strategy. The converse is not true for stakeholder theory. It does not enable companies to 
develop a strategy when some of the existing “stakeholders” are no longer essential or even 
desirable in light of changes in the external environment and internal capabilities. 
1.5. Integration and Summary 
  Dave Norton and I introduced the Balanced Scorecard to provide a missing component 
and bridge among these various apparently conflicting literatures that had been developed in 
complete isolation from each other: the literature on quality and lean management, which 
emphasized employees’ continuous improvement activities to reduce waste and increase company 
responsiveness; the literature on financial economics, which placed heightened emphasis on 
financial performance measures; and the stakeholder theory where the firm was an intermediary 
attempting to forge contracts that satisfied all its different constituents. We attempted to retain the 
valuable insights from each. Employee and process performance are critical for current and future 
success. Financial metrics, ultimately, will increase if companies’ performance improves. And to 
optimize long-term shareholder value, the firm had to internalize the preferences and expectations 
of its shareholders, customers, suppliers, employees, and communities. The key was to have a 
                                                 
8  “Amanco: Developing the Sustainability Scorecard,” HBS Case # 107-038. 18 
 
more robust measurement and management system that included both operational metrics as 
leading indicators and financial metrics as lagging outcomes, along with several other metrics to 
measure a company’s progress in driving future performance. 
  This insight became glaringly obvious to us during our initial 1990 multi-company 
research project when we invited the innovative vice-president of quality and productivity at 
Analog Devices, Arthur Schneiderman, to address our group. At the end of the presentation, in 
response to a question about how the company was doing with its quality improvement metric 
and corporate scorecard, he reported that every quality measure on its corporate scorecard had 
experienced dramatic improvements. He also noted, however, that the company’s stock price had 
decreased by nearly 70% during the past three years. The company had failed to translate its 
improved manufacturing and delivery performance into increased sales and margins, and the 
stock price reflected this shortcoming. The failure to include the link between quality 
improvements on Analog’s quality scorecard to a customer value proposition or to any customer 
outcomes likely contributed to the shareholder value loss. Norton and I recognized that any 
comprehensive measurement and management system had to link operational performance 
improvements to customer and financial performance. Our Balanced Scorecard, while 
incorporating Analog’s operational improvement metrics, also incorporated metrics for 
innovation, employee capabilities, technology, organizational learning, and customer success. 
And unlike the stakeholder perspective, we did place shareholder value as the highest-level metric, 
with all the other stakeholders reflected in how they contributed to the company’s success in 
maximizing long-term shareholder value.  
 
2. Strategic Objectives  
  As Norton and I began working with the companies, after the initial HBR article 
appeared, we faced the question about how to choose the metrics that would go on a Balanced 
Scorecard. We could have adopted the generic metrics that many companies were already using, 
such as customer satisfaction, customer retention, defect rates, yields, lead and process times, and 
employee satisfaction. But the client companies and we were dissatisfied with these metrics. They 
were too generic. By 1992, virtually all companies (airlines and dysfunctional companies, such as 
WorldCom, being notable exceptions) were attempting to increase customer satisfaction, improve 
process quality, and motivate employee performance. As we probed this issue with executives, 
we quickly learned that creating a Balanced Scorecard should not start with selecting metrics.  19 
 
  Many companies, however, already had extensive measurements from their existing 
quality and performance improvement programs and wanted to create a quick Balanced Scorecard 
by classifying each of their existing metrics into one of the four BSC perspectives. While having 
a structure for reporting their nonfinancial metrics was better than having no nonfinancial metrics 
or simply a long list of them, this bottoms-up process of classifying existing measurements was 
unlikely to capture the most important drivers of future success.  
  A second group of companies looked externally for their metrics and conducted 
benchmarking studies to learn the metrics used by the companies they admired most. Norton and 
I did not want the Balanced Scorecard to become a benchmarking exercise. We knew that even 
high-performing companies succeeded with strategies that were quite different from each other. 
The metrics used by a company following a low cost strategy (WalMart, for example) should be 
distinct from those used by a company implementing a complete customer solutions strategy (e.g., 
Nordstrom) or a company with an innovative product leadership strategy (e.g., Armani and 
Ferragamo). Adopting metrics used by a company with a different strategy would confuse and 
distract the focus of employees and cause the strategy to fail. 
  Company executives continually told us that their highest priority was implementing their 
strategy. We came to recognize that before selecting metrics, companies should describe what 
they were attempting to achieve with their strategies, and, further, that the four BSC perspectives 
provides a robust structure for companies to express their strategic objectives. The financial 
objective would include a high-level objective for sustained shareholder value creation and 
supporting sub-objectives for revenue growth, productivity, and risk management. The customer 
perspective would include objectives for desired customer outcomes, such as to acquire, satisfy, 
and retain targeted customers, and to build the share of their spending done with the company.  
  In addition to these somewhat generic lagging measures of customer performance, we 
recognized that companies needed to express objectives for the value proposition they offered 
customers. The value proposition, the unique combination of price, quality, availability, ease and 
speed of purchase, functionality, relationship and service, was the heart of the strategy, what 
differentiated the company from its competitors or what it intended to do better than they for the 
targeted customers. Thus companies following a low cost strategy would offer low prices, defect-
free products and speedy purchase. Product innovating companies offered products and services 
whose performance exceeded that of competitors along dimensions that targeted customers 
valued.  20 
 
  Objectives in the process perspective reflected how the company would create and 
deliver the differentiated value proposition and meet the financial objectives for productivity 
improvements. Objectives in the learning and growth perspectives described the goals for 
employees, information systems, and organizational alignment.  
  Over the years, we learned new ways to write strategic objectives. Many companies now 
write their strategic objectives in quotes to reflect the voice of their customers and employees. For 
example, one medium-sized community bank that was shifting from its traditional product push 
strategy to one that emphasized developing complete financial solutions for its targeted customers 
expressed its customer objectives as: 
1.  “Understand me and give me the right information and advice” 
2.  “Give me convenient access to the right products” 
3.  “Appreciate me and get things done easily, quickly, and right” 
Each of these customer objectives, once identified, could be easily measured, such as by the 
following list: 
1a. Number of customers profiled 
1b. Number of customers with financial plans 
2.  Number of targeted customer using on-line channel for transactions 
3.  Customer survey responses on questions related to appreciation and ease of working with 
the bank. 
Similarly, the learning and growth objectives, written in the voice of employees, included: 
“We hire, develop, retain, and reward great people” 
“We are trained in the skills we need to succeed.” 
“We understand the strategy and know what we need to do to implement it” 
“We have the information and tools we need to do our job.” 
 
  As with the customer objectives, once the employee objectives had been selected and 
expressed, it was a simple task to select metrics that measured the performance for each of these 
strategic objectives. These metrics were more aligned to the strategy than generic metrics of 
employee morale and satisfaction. 
  Thus, while our initial article had a subtitle, “Measures that Drive Performance,” we soon 
learned that we had to start not with measures but with descriptions of what the company wanted 
to accomplish. It turned out that selection of measures was much simpler after company 21 
 
executives described their strategies through the multiple strategic objectives in the four BSC 
perspectives.     
 
3. Strategy Maps 
It soon became natural to describe the causal relationships between strategic objectives. 
For example, a simple causal chain of strategic objectives would be: employees better trained in 
quality management tools reduce process cycle times and process defects; the improved processes 
lead to shorter customer lead times, improved on-time delivery, and fewer defects experienced by 
customers; the quality improvements experienced by customers lead to higher satisfaction, 
retention, and spending, which drives, ultimately, higher revenues and margins. All the objectives 
are linked in cause-and-effect relationships, starting with employees, continuing through 
processes and customers, and culminating in higher financial performance. 
  The idea of causal linkages among Balanced Scorecard objectives and measures led to 
the creation of a strategy map, articulated in an HBR article and several books (Kaplan & Norton 
2000, 2001, 2004). Figure 2 shows the current structure for a strategy map. Today, all BSC 
projects build a strategy map of strategic objectives first and only afterwards select metrics for 
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Figure 2: The strategy map links intangible assets and critical processes to the 
value proposition and customer and financial outcomes 
 
  We recognized that the weakest link in a strategy map and Balanced Scorecard was the 
learning and growth perspective. For many years, as one executive described it, the learning and 
growth perspective was “the black hole of the Balanced Scorecard.” While companies had some 
generic measures for employees, such as employee satisfaction and morale, turnover, absenteeism 
and lateness (probably growing out of the stakeholder movement of the previous decade), none 
had metrics that linked their employee capabilities to the strategy. A few scholars had 
investigated the connection between improvements in human resources and improved financial 
performance (e.g. Huselid, 1995; Becker et al., 1998) 
  Dave Norton led a research project in 2002 and 2003 with senior HR professionals to 
explore how to better link the measurement of human resources to strategic objectives. From this 
work came the concepts of strategic human capital readiness and strategic job families and, by 
extension, the linkages to information capital and organizational capital. These important 
extensions to embed the capabilities of a company’s most important intangible assets were 
described in an HBR article and a book (Kaplan & Norton, 2004a&b) 23 
 
4. Extending Balanced Scorecard to Non-Profit and Public Sector Enterprises 
  While initially developed for private sector enterprises, the Balanced Scorecard was soon 
extended to nonprofit and public sector enterprises (NPSEs). Prior to the development of the 
Balanced Scorecard, the performance reports of NPSEs focused only on financial measures, such 
as budgets, funds appropriated, donations, expenditures, and operating expense ratios. Clearly, 
however, the performance of NPSEs cannot be measured by financial indicators. Their success 
has to be measured by their effectiveness in providing benefits to constituents. The Balanced 
Scorecard helps NPSEs select a coherent use of nonfinancial measures to assess their 
performance with constituents. 
  Since financial success is not their primary objective, NPSEs cannot use the standard 
architecture of the Balanced Scorecard strategy map where financial objectives are the ultimate, 
high-level outcomes to be achieved. NPSEs generally place an objective related to their social 
impact and mission, such as reducing poverty, pollution, diseases, or school dropout rates, or 
improving health, biodiversity, education, and economic opportunities. A nonprofit or public 
sector agency’s mission represents the accountability between it and society, as well as the 
rationale for its existence and ongoing support. The measured improvement in an NPSE’s social 
impact objective may take years to become noticeable, which is why the measures in the other 
perspectives provide the short- to intermediate-term targets and feedback necessary for year-to-
year control and accountability. 
  One additional modification is required to expand the customer perspective. Donors or 
taxpayers provide the financial resources—they pay for the service—while another group, the 
citizens and beneficiaries, receive the service. Both constituents and resource suppliers should be 
the placed at the top of an NPSE strategy map.  
5. The Strategy Management System 
  My HBS colleague, Robert Simons, developed the Levers of Control management 
control framework (Simons, 1995a&b) at the same time that Norton and I were developing the 
Balanced Scorecard. Simons identified several types of management control systems that 
managers use to motivate, monitor, and manage their strategies. The control systems included 
belief systems (mission, vision and values), boundary systems, internal control systems, 
diagnostic systems, and interactive systems. As described at the beginning of this chapter, Norton 
and I originally envisioned the Balanced Scorecard as an enhanced performance measurement 
system, labeled by Simons as a diagnostic system. Our vision for the BSC was for managers to 24 
 
define and track performance among multiple financial and nonfinancial measures that were 
considered important for company success.  
  Several senior executives soon taught us that the Balanced Scorecard could operate in a 
far more powerful manner than its use as a management reporting and performance monitoring 
system. For example, Larry Brady, then President of the FMC Corporation, stated:
9 
I think that it’s important for companies not to approach the scorecard as the 
latest fad. […] You hear about a good idea, several people on corporate staff 
work on it, probably with some expensive outside consultants, and you put in a 
system that’s a bit different [incremental] from what existed before. 
 
It gets worse if you think of the scorecard as a new measurement system that 
eventually requires hundreds and thousands of measurements and a big, 
expensive executive information system. These companies lose sight of the 
essence of the scorecard: its focus, its simplicity, and its vision. The real benefit 
comes from making the scorecard the cornerstone of the way you run the 
business. It should be the core of the management system, not the measurement 
system. [It should become] the lever to streamline and focus strategy that can 
lead to breakthrough performance. 
 
  Brady and other early BSC implementation leaders (at Mobil US Marketing and Refining,  
Cigna Property and Casualty, and Chemical Retail Bank) adopted and used the scorecard to help 
them describe their strategies and implement a new strategy management system based on 
scorecard measurements. The new insights helped us formulate the fundamental structure for a 
generic strategy management system (Kaplan & Norton, 1996a & b) 
  The development of the strategy management system transformed the Balanced 
Scorecard from being an extended diagnostic system to an interactive system, defined by Bob 
Simons to have the following characteristics (Simons 1995a: 97): 
1.  Information generated by the system is an important and recurring agenda addressed by 
the highest levels of management 
2.  The interactive control system demands frequent and regular attention from operating 
managers at all levels of the organization. 
3.  Data generated by the system are interpreted and discussed in face-to-face meetings of 
superiors, subordinates, and peers. 
4.  The system is a catalyst for the continual challenge and debated of underlying data, 
assumptions, and actions plans. 
 
                                                 
9   Interview with Larry Brady in R. S. Kaplan and D.P. Norton, “Putting the Balanced Scorecard to 
Work,” Harvard Business Review (September-October 1993): 147. 25 
 
  Simons’ research indicated that CEOs selected an existing management system, such as 
the budget, the project management system, or the revenue system, and operated it interactively. 
Our development of the strategy map and Balanced Scorecard turned out, serendipitously, to offer 
managers the framework for a generic interactive system. Managers could now design a 
customized interactive system based on their strategy, and, following Brady’s insight, use the 
strategy map and scorecard as the cornerstone of their management system for executing the 
strategy.
10 
  For example of the system’s interactivity, two senior executives at Mobil USM&R 
described how they used the Balanced Scorecard with their business unit and support unit 
managers. Bob McCool, CEO of the division stated: 
For a meeting with a BU manager, I have the manager plus 
representatives from various [support units], like supply, marketing, and 
convenience-stores. And we have a conversation. In the past we were a bunch of 
controllers sitting around talking about variances. Now we discuss what’s gone 
right, what’s gone wrong. What should we keep doing, what should we stop 
doing? What resources do we need to get back on track, not explaining a negative 
variance due to some volume mix. 
The process enables me to see how the NBU managers think, plan, and 
execute. I can see the gaps, and by understanding the manager’s culture and 
mentality, I can develop customized programs to make him or her a better 
manager. 
Brian Baker, executive vice president of Mobil USM&R talked about his meetings: 
I went into these reviews thinking they would be long and arduous. I was 
pleasantly surprised how simple they were. Managers came in prepared. They 
were paying attention to their scorecards and using them in a very productive 
way—to drive their organization hard to achieve the targets. How they weighted 
their measures spoke clearly about their priorities of relative importance up and 
down the four perspectives.  
Basically, there’s no way I can understand and supervise all the activities 
that report to me. I need a device like the scorecard where the business unit 
managers are measuring their own performance. My job is to keep adjusting the 
light I shine on their strategy and implementation, to monitor and guide their 
journeys, and see whether there are any potential storms on the horizon that we 
should address. 
  These managers had never seen Simons’ description and definition of an interactive 
system. But their natural leadership style was to operate their scorecard system to question, probe, 
                                                 
10   Many academics, consultants, and managers, however, continue to think erroneously of the scorecard 
as a performance measurement system only. Their knowledge and acquaintance with the scorecard is 
probably based only on reading the original 1992 HBR article or the first half of the initial Balanced 
Scorecard book. 26 
 
challenge, and coach about the strategy and its implementation, an ideal example of Simons’ 
description of an interactive system. 
  After studying the successful implementations of Mobil USM&R and other early 
adopters we proposed the following five leadership and management processes for successful 
strategy execution, helping to create “the strategy-focused organization” (SFO) (Kaplan & Norton 
2001): 
1.  Mobilize change through executive leadership 
2.  Translate the strategy 
3.  Align the organization to the strategy 
4.  Motivate employees to make strategy their everyday job 
5.  Govern to make strategy a continual process 
 
This research completed the transformation of the Balanced Scorecard from a 
performance measurement system to an interactive management system for strategy execution.  
 Subsequent  work,  documented in additional books and Harvard Business Review articles, 
expanded upon this framework. Our third book, Strategy Maps, already mentioned, expanded 
upon Principle 2. Our fourth book, Alignment, expanded on Principle 3. We showed how strategy 
maps and scorecards could articulate the role for a corporate strategy that defined how to a 
collection of business units could create more value than if each unit operated autonomously, as a 
stand-alone company (Kaplan & Norton, 2006a&b). We discovered that all the various corporate 
strategies for enhancing the value of their business units could be represented using the four 
Balanced Scorecard perspectives, as shown in Figure 3.  27 
 
 Intangible Assets – Share a competency around the development of 
human, information and organization capital.
 Strategic Themes – Provide leadership in complex organizations 
through the management of strategic themes.
 Internal Capital Management– Create synergy through effective 
management of internal capital & labor markets.
 Corporate Brand – Integrate a diverse set of businesses around a 
single brand, promoting common values or themes.
 Cross-Selling – Create value by cross-selling a broad range of 
products/services from several business units.
 Common Value Proposition – Create a consistent buying experience, 
conforming to corporate standards at multiple outlets.
 Shared Services – Create economies of scale by sharing the 
systems, facilities and personnel in critical support processes.
 Value Chain Integration – Create value by integrating contiguous 
processes in the industry value chain.
Figure 3 Sources of Enterprise Synergy
The Enterprise Scorecard
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  Our most recent work has focused on Principle 5, in which companies link strategy and 
operations (Kaplan & Norton, 2008a&b). Figure 4 shows the architecture of a comprehensive six 
stage closed-loop management system that links strategic planning with operational execution.  
1.  Develop the strategy 
2.  Translate the strategy 
3.  Align the organization 
4.  Plan operations 
5.  Monitor and learn 
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In the sixth stage, managers use internal operational data and new external environmental and 
competitive data to test and update the strategy, which launches another loop around the 
integrated strategy and operational management system.  This work integrates not only our prior 
work on strategy maps, alignment, and employee motivation, but also quality management, 
dashboards, time-driven activity-based costing for resource capacity planning and strategy 
feedback (Kaplan & Anderson, 2004, 2007), strategy development and formulation tools, and 
analytics for testing and adapting the strategy.  
This most recent development is about much more than just the Balanced Scorecard. It 
embeds the original Balanced Scorecard framework as a component within a comprehensive 
management system that integrates strategy and operations. One can view the proposed 
management system as accomplishing the comprehensive framework advocated earlier by Herb 
Simon  – for scorecarding, attention-directing, and problem-solving – and Robert Anthony, for 
strategic planning, management control and operational control. Rather than have them as 
separate activities, as suggested by Simon and Anthony, we now have the various activities for 29 
 
strategy development, planning, alignment, operational planning, operational control, and strategy 
control integrated within a closed-loop, comprehensive management system. 
  The integrated and comprehensive closed-loop management system has many moving 
parts and inter-relationships, and requires simultaneous coordination among all organizational 
line and staff units. Existing processes that today are run by different parts of the organization – 
such as budgeting by finance, personal goals and communications by human resources, and 
process management by operations – must be modified and coordinated to create strategic 
alignment.  They must work as a system instead of a set of uncoordinated sub-systems as they do 
today.  In addition, we have proposed some entirely new processes – such as creating strategy 
maps and scorecards that align organizational units and employees to the strategy. Because these 
processes are new to most organizations, they have no natural home within the existing structure. 
Clearly, organizations face a complex task to implement such a complex, inter-related system.   
  We have identified the need for a new organizational function, which we call the Office 
of Strategy Management (OSM), to be the process owner of the strategy execution system and its 
component processes (Kaplan & Norton 2005). The OSM has ownership for the new processes 
that translate and cascade the strategy, link it to operations, and organize the strategy review and 
strategy testing and adapting meetings. It also integrates and coordinates activities that align 
strategy and operations across functions and business units. The OSM, analogous to a military 
general’s chief-of-staff keeps all the diverse organizational players ─ executive team, business 
units, regional units, support units (finance, human resources, information technology), 
departments, and, ultimately, the employees ─ aligned with each other, operating independently, 
when appropriate, but also coming together, as needed, to execute the enterprise’s strategy. 
  
6.  Future Opportunities 
  This article has documented the precursors of the Balanced Scorecard and its continued 
evolution, from its introduction in 1992 to recent developments in 2008, the time at which this 
article was written. Intensive and continual collaboration with innovating companies, public 
sector agencies, and nonprofit organizations have informed the enhancements and capabilities of 
the original Balanced Scorecard. Among these advances are the following: 
  Strategy maps of strategic objectives 
  Extending the concept to nonprofit and public sector enterprises 30 
 
  Measurement of strategic readiness of intangible assets 
  Role for executive leadership 
  Creating synergies through alignment of business and support units to corporate 
strategy 
  Using communication to create intrinsic motivation 
  Deploying extrinsic motivation by aligning employees’ personal objectives and 
compensation to strategic objectives 
  Linking strategy and operations in a new closed-loop management system 
  Creating the office of strategy management 
  It’s not easy to respond when questioned about what happens next. While each of these 
advances was a logical extension of previous work, each presented itself incrementally and 
opportunistically, not as part of a planned evolution of the concept over a 15 year period. While 
acknowledging a cloudy crystal ball, I can see several big opportunities for future work. 
First, the early adopters of the BSC – Rockwater, FMC, Mobil, Chemical Bank, Cigna 
P&C, AT&T Canada, Wells Fargo Online Services, and City of Charlotte – had superb leaders. 
Initially, perhaps, we took such leadership for granted. Subsequent experience revealed that when 
the Balanced Scorecard failed in organizations, we could usually trace the roots of failure back to 
lack of executive leadership, not to any particular inherent design flaw in strategy maps, 
scorecards, or the four other strategy-focused organization principles. The failures occurred when 
staff groups or functional officers introduced the scorecard with the acquiescence but not the 
leadership and commitment of the CEO of the business unit. And the purpose for introducing the 
Balanced Scorecard was not for effective strategy execution, but for more tactical reasons, such 
as to change the compensation system, to reinforce a quality management system, or to change 
the reporting system to give managers more access to information about their operations. All of 
these goals are laudable but none, by itself, can transform and align an organization for effective 
strategy execution, the principal deliverable, as it turned out, for Balanced Scorecard 
implementations.  
  Future research studies of BSC implementations could certainly benefit from measuring 
organizational leadership in each implementation and assessing this factor’s role in creating 
success. Several authors have done limited testing about the environments in which the Balanced 
Scorecard has succeeded or failed. Most of these studies were ad hoc correlations of nonfinancial 
and financial variables. Few of the studies were informed by the concepts described in our 
writings on strategy-focused organization principles and the most recent work on integration of 31 
 
strategic planning and operational execution. The empirical evidence that Norton and I have seen 
and documented over the past 15 years identifies leadership as the most important variable 
explaining success or failure. To state a bold hypothesis, leadership may be both necessary and 
sufficient for success. It is necessary since without it, the Balanced Scorecard will be just another 
ad hoc reporting system, and the gains from embedding the Balanced Scorecard in a system for 
effective strategy execution will not be realized. Leadership is required to translate strategy into 
the linked strategic objectives on a strategy map and then to use the map and the accompanying 
scorecard interactively as described in this chapter. The more challenging claim is that it is also 
sufficient. This hypothesis emerges from the documented best practices, drawn from hundreds of 
successful implementations, on how to build and operate the new management system for 
strategy execution. Managers can apply this body of knowledge, which is referenced in this 
article, to implement the four strategy-focused organization principles other than leadership. But 
none of the four principles can be effectively mobilized and sustained without leadership at the 
top. Of course, such a strong claim about both necessity and sufficiency needs to be tested 
through careful research designs and instruments.   
  Research in leadership would start with measurement; there could be multiple forms of 
effective leadership, but some aspects may be necessary or common across all leadership styles. 
Once leadership can be measured validly, then cross-sectional or longitudinal research can be 
performed to see its influence on explaining variation in the results delivered from following the 
five SFO principles.   
Second, the emerging literature and practice on enterprise risk management needs to be 
more formally embedded in the strategy map and Balanced Scorecard. Many companies, 
especially financial services companies, have already specified risk management objectives in the 
scorecard’s financial and process objectives. But these additions have been incremental and not 
part of an integrated risk management framework. Our generic strategy map template (see Figure 
2) emphasizes two primary financial sub-strategies, revenue growth and productivity, as the 
drivers of sustainable shareholder value creation. Surely, risk management must be introduced as 
a third pillar for financial performance, and perhaps an entirely new set of risk management 
processes should be included within the process perspective. Given the intense focus of 
companies around the world to improve their measurement and management of risk, we should 
expect important advances, over the next five years, to embed risk management objectives more 
centrally into the strategy execution framework. 32 
 
  Third, strategy maps still represent a highly-aggregated view of causal relationships 
among strategic objectives. In order to make strategy maps more visually appealing to managers 
and employees, we have simplified the causal relationships assumed within the strategy map (one 
might even describe the generic strategy map as a “dumbed-down” representation of causal 
linkages). Norton and I, both trained as electrical engineers, have been aware from the outset that 
systems dynamics techniques could help produce a more detailed model that links both strategic 
and operational objectives in a more elaborate mapping exercise. A detailed systems dynamics 
model would incorporate causal linkages that have estimates of magnitude and time delay, as well 
as more complex feedback loops than are presently visualized in the generic strategy map. For an 
example of such a quantified linkage, analysts could estimate the percentage improvement in a 
lagging indicator that would be expected from, say, a 1% improvement in a leading indicator. The 
analysts would also estimate the time delay between a 1% improvement in a leading indicator and 
the expected response in a lagging indicator. And the causal linkages need not be uni-dimensional. 
The model could include multiple leading indicators and impacts that can be a combination of 
linear, multiplicative, or even Boolean (no impact if the improvement is less than a given amount; 
a jump in impact once a threshold level of improvement has been achieved).  
  The statistical and modeling capabilities for constructing models of detailed causal 
relationships already exists. And many companies, particularly those operating hundreds or 
thousands of relatively similar decentralized units, generate sufficient data each month to estimate 
even complex models. The shortage seems to be how to marry analytic capabilities with 
companies that generate sufficient data and have a senior management team capable of 
understanding and using the dynamic, causal models effectively to guide their strategies and 
operations.  
Thus, while much has been learned over the past 15 years, much interesting research can 
still be done. And with many private, public sector, and nonprofit enterprises around the world 
implementing new strategy execution systems based on the Balanced Scorecard framework, the 
opportunities for informed empirical research are great. 33 
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